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A COMPARISON OF THE YUGOSLAVIAN
AND RWANDAN WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS: UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
AND THE "ELEMENTARY DICTATES OF
HUMANIT*
Mark R. von Sternberg'
I. INTRODUCTION
By resolution dated February 22, 1993,' the U.N. Security
Council determined to establish an international war crimes
tribunal with the objective of prosecuting and, where appropri-
ate, sanctioning, certain violations of international humanitari-
an law deemed to have taken place within the former Yugosla-
via since 1991.2 Jurisdiction was predicated under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter.3 By resolution dated November 8, 1994, a
similar measure was adopted with respect to grave human
rights violations arising out of the recent climactic violence
affecting Rwanda.4
Part II of this article analyzes the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of both the Yugoslavian and the Rwandan war crimes
tribunals; Part III gives specific reference to the violations
determined to have been committed by U.N. fact-finding com-
missions. Such findings of violations have included "grave
breaches" of governing provisions of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and of Protocols I and II thereunder;5 crimes against
* This paper was prepared as the Report of the New York County Lawyers'
Association's Committee on Foreign and International Law. The Report was ap-
proved by the Board of Directors of the Association on November 13, 1995.
** Senior Attorney, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, InclCatholic Chari-
ties Archdiocese of New York. J.D., Vanderbilt University 1973; LL.M., New York
University 1984. Member New York Bar and New York County Lawyers' Associ-
ation Committee on Foreign and International Law.
1. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc.
5/INF/49 (1994).
2. The war crimes process is now quite advanced and a number of indict-
ments have been handed down. See Justice Without Victors, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7-13,
1995, at 44.
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
4. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter Statute of the Rwandan Tribunal].
5. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
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humanity and war crimes within the meaning of the
Nuremberg Charter; violations of the Genocide Convention;'
and criminal misconduct under customary international hu-
manitarian law (including the Hague Convention (IV) Respect-
ing the Laws and Conventions of War on Land).'
Part IV presents the thrust of this article. It sets forth the
approach of the United Nations in finding the applicable law
and elucidates the organization's methodology in determining
the precise scope of international penal jurisdiction.
A comparison of the two war crimes tribunals is of mo-
ment. According to U.N. findings, the war in Yugoslavia pri-
marily entails international armed conflict.9 By contrast,
Rwanda has been plagued essentially by civil war." As Pro-
fessor Theodor Meron has observed, neither the Geneva
Conventions' "grave breaches" provisions nor the Hague Con-
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
3146, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3250, 75
U.N.T.S. 85, 116 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
3420, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 238 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 388 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 11 (arts.
11 and 85 apply to armed conflict which is international in character); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol III (contains no "grave
breaches" provisions, but clearly constitutes a restatement of fundamental human
rights protected in non-international armed conflict, violation of which may support
a finding that a "war crime" has been committed).
6. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
art. 6(b)-(c), adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12,
1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
8. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
9. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994)
[hereinafter Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia].
10. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Secu-
rity Council Resolution 935 (1994), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1405 (1994) [hereinafter Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda].
112
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
vention extend universal jurisdiction over purely internal wars,
although it is otherwise with "crimes against humanity" under
the Nuremberg Charter and violations of the Genocide Conven-
tion."' This limitation upon the tribunals' jurisdictional base
has constrained the U.N. legal specialists to devote consider-
able analysis to the "bases and ranges" of international crimi-
nal jurisdiction. To the extent that this legal thinking consti-
tutes the most interesting aspect of the various reports of the
United Nations' impanelled legal experts, it will form the cen-
tral focus of this discussion.
U.N. legal experts have not been absolutely clear respect-
ing the scope of international humanitarian penal jurisdiction,
particularly in the area of internal armed conflict. On the one
hand, U.N. legal scholars have given a restrictive interpreta-
tion to the scope of crimes against humanity under the
Nuremberg Charter, such as murder, extermination, deporta-
tion, and other inhuman acts committed against the civilian
population in both internal and international war, by the re-
quirement that such acts be pursuant to an official policy of
discrimination. 2 At the same time, U.N. scholars have argued
(and the war crimes tribunal for Yugoslavia has agreed) that
common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, applicable in
civil war and prohibiting substantially the same violations as
the Nuremberg Charter but not requiring any official policy of
discrimination, may be criminally enforced even though com-
mon article 3 is not a "grave breach" provision giving rise to
universal jurisdiction.
This paper urges a construction of article 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter which would render the substantive viola-
tions identified in it to be the practical equivalent of those
described in common article 3.13 Such an interpretation con-
11. Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN
AFF., Summer 1993, at 122, 124, 130.
12. For a full discussion of the applicable provisions of the Nuremberg Char-
ter and the Geneva Conventions, see infra notes 88-160 and accompanying text.
13. That is, a violation would not have to be premised on an official policy of
discrimination. It must be noted that the class of persons protected under common
article 3 (those who have laid down their arms or who are otherwise hors de
combat) is substantially broader than those identified in article 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter which protects only civilians. Compare Nuremberg Charter,
supra note 6, art. 6(c) with First Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, 6 U.S.T
at 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, 6
U.S.T. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 3,
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forms to the plain language in both instruments and is consis-
tent with the peremptory norms therein expressed.
It is imperative to note in this respect that extrajudicial
murders, exterminations, deportations, and other cruel and
inhumane acts (at least when committed in internal armed
conflict) relate to violations of basic human rights which are
protected under the emerging doctrine of jus cogens."4 Viola-
tors of such fundamental norms may, in appropriate circum-
stances, be made the subject of universal jurisdiction even in
the absence of a convention since the offenders themselves are
deemed hostes humani generis."
This paper advances a plain meaning interpretation of
"crimes against humanity" under the Nuremberg Charter and
common article 3 which would give full effect to the perempto-
ry norms underlying their provisions. It is furthermore submit-
ted that such a construction is to be preferred to an interpre-
tation which departs from the plain language of the text so as
to derogate from the customary law of human rights with
which both instruments are in unambiguous agreement.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The bases of subject matter jurisdiction in the Rwandan
and the Yugoslavian war crimes tribunals differs substantially.
Both tribunals draw from the same substantive body of law,
i.e., the laws of war, customary and prescribed, such as the
prohibition of "crimes against humanity" and genocide. How-
ever, each emphasizes a different element of this corpus of
jurisprudence for its jurisdictional base.
6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5,
art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288.
14. The term jus cogens is used interchangeably with such terms as "peremp-
tory norms" and "fundamental human rights." While definitions have sometimes
been elusive, this term has been interpreted largely to mean "principles that the
legal conscience of mankind deem[s] absolutely essential to coexistence in the in-
ternational community." U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, SUMMARY
RECORDS OF THE PLENARY MEETINGS AND OF MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE at 294, U.N. Doc. A]CONFJ39/11, U.N. Sales No. E.68.V.7 (1969) (state-
ment of Mr. Suarez (Mexico)). For an excellent discussion of definitions, see Karen
Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12
HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L. REV. 412, 414-16 (1989).
15. See United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1884)
(determining that piracy gives rise to universal jurisdiction under customary inter-
national law).
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As suggested earlier, this difference is largely mandated
by the fact that, whereas the Yugoslavian tribunal is concerned
with criminal violations arising out of an "international war"
in which the full scope of humanitarian law applies, the
Rwandan tribunal is engaged in the more problematic and less
regulated area of civil war. The following is a summary of the
international criminal provisions which the two tribunals are
to apply.
A. Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal"6
Primary in the tribunal's arsenal are the "grave breaches"
provisions common to all four conventions. 7 As stated previ-
ously, these prohibitions reach only international armed con-
flict. Specifically, they make punishable:
[WIilful killing, torture, inhuman treatment, including biolog-
ical experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or
unlawful confinement of a protected person,.., or wilfully
depriving a protected person of the rights of a fair and regu-
lar trial proscribed in the present Convention, taking of hos-
tages, and extensive destruction and appropriation of proper-
ty, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlaw-
fully and wantonly."8
In all four Conventions this provision relates specifically to
"protected persons," i.e., those who are sick and wounded in
the field, the wounded and sick at sea, prisoners of war, and
civilians. 9
Similarly article 85(3) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conven-
16. Subject matter jurisdiction is set forth in the statute of the tribunal which
is to be found in the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOI 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993)
[hereinafter Statute of the Yugoslavian Tribunal].
17. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3146,
75 U.N.T.S. at 62; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75
U.N.T.S. at 116; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3420, 75
U.N.T.S. at 238; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at
3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388 (relating to the protection of civilian persons in time of
war).
18. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75
U.N.T.S. at 388.
19. See supra note 17.
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tions" renders punishable a wide spectrum of willful miscon-
duct where international armed conflict is concerned. The
following offenses are proscribed if committed against a pro-
tected person: making the civilian population an object of at-
tack; launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian
population knowing that such attack will cause excessive loss
of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian property;
launching an attack against works containing dangerous forces
knowing that such attack will cause excessive injury to civil-
ians or their property; and making non-defended localities and
demilitarized zones the object of attack.2 Also punishable un-
der article 85(4) of Protocol I are: the transfer by the occupying
power of its own civilian population into the occupied territory
and the transfer of the population of the occupied territory
outside the territory; practices of apartheid and inhuman prac-
tices entailing racial discrimination; and making places of wor-
ship, historical monuments, and works of art the objects of at-
tack.'
The Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia has determined
that the war in that country is primarily of an international
character,' a determination which, from a jurisdictional point
20. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 85(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 42.
21. Id. art. 85(3)(a)-(d).
22. Id. art. 85(4)(a), (c)-(d). Apartheid as an offense is included as a war crime
under Protocol I. Id. art. 85(4)(c). The Apartheid Convention forbids practices
aimed at racial segregation and at inhuman acts aimed at assuring the domina-
tion of one racial group over another. Included within the proscribed acts are the
following:
(a) Denial in a member or members of a racial group or groups of
the right to life and liberty of person:
i) By murder of members of a racial group or groups;
(ii) By infliction upon members of a racial group or groups of serious
bodily or mental harm, by the infringement of their freedom or dignity,
or by subjecting them to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment;
(iii) By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members of a
racial group or groups.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, art. 11(a), at 75,
U.N. Doc. A19030 (1974).
23. Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 9, % 44.
Indeed, the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia has indicated that, should the
war be determined to be of a non-international character, there would be a sub-
stantial effect on subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the Commission of Ex-
perts for Yugoslavia has found:
The treaty law designed for internal armed conflict is common article 3
[Vol. XXUI:
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of view, is of moment. Neither the Geneva Conventions, nor
their implementing Protocols, contain sections specifically
criminalizing (i.e., rendering a "grave breach") activity which
takes place during non-international (i.e., internal) armed
conflict. The Geneva Conventions do, however, contain a com-
mon article 324 which relates, by its terms, to wars not of an
international character. The norms provided for under common
article 3 have been generally recognized as jus cogens, i.e., as
non-derogable rules of international law,' and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has described common article 3 as set-
ting forth "elementary considerations of humanity."6
of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol 11 of 1977, and article 19
of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict. These legal sources do not use the term
"grave breaches" or "war crimes." Further, the content of customary law
applicable to internal armed conflict is debatable. As a result, in general,
unless the parties to an internal armed conflict agree otherwise, the only
offenses committed in internal armed conflict for which universal jurisdic-
tion exists are "crimes against humanity" and genocide, which apply
irrespective of the conflicts' classification.
Id. 42.
24. For example, article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions provides in
material part:
(1) Persons taking no part in the hostilities, including members of the
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without adverse distinction founded
on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar
criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-men-
tioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, muti-
lation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions with-
out previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, af-
fording all of the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispens-
able to civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
First Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, 6 U.S.T at 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32;
Second Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at
86; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 136; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75
U.N.T.S. at 288.
25. Parker & Neylon, supra note 14, at 434-35.
26. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 105
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Common article 3 is really divided into two parts. Sections
3(1) and (2) contain "affirmative" duties: those not taking an
active part in the fighting are to be treated humanely, 7 and
the wounded and sick are to be cared for.' Common article
3(1)(a)-(d) sets forth the core of this provision and expressly
prohibits with respect to any "protected person": murder, muti-
lation, cruel treatment and torture; the taking of hostages;
humiliating treatment; and the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted courtY
The Nuremberg Charter, on the other hand, clearly ex-
tends criminal jurisdiction to misconduct taking place both in
international and in non-international armed conflict. Among
its prohibitions are "crimes against humanity." These include:
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial
or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpe-
trated.30
Also applicable both to international and to internal armed
conflict is the Genocide Convention.3 The Genocide Conven-
tion renders unlawful acts whose purpose is to "destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,"
including acts directed at eliminating the group's intellectual,
political, academic or business leadership.32 The intent to de-
stroy the designated group must be present for a violation to
(June 27).
27. See supra note 24 (text of article 3(1)).
28. See supra note 24 (text of article 3(2)).
29. See supra note 24 (text of article 3(1)(a)-(d)).
30. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 6, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S.
at 288-89 (emphasis added). Unlike the statute for the Rwandan tribunal (dis-
cussed in part I1B), the statute for the Yugoslavian tribunal mirrors faithfully the
provisions of the Nuremberg Charter and does not require that violations be pur-
suant to a policy of discrimination. Statute of the Yugoslavian Tribunal, supra note
16, % 5. Notwithstanding, the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia has deter-
mined that an article 6(c) violation must be based on an official policy of discrim-
ination. Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 9, at 23, 1
84.
31. Genocide Convention, supra note 7.
32. Id. arts. I-JL 78 U.N.T.S. at 280-81.
[Vol. XXI
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
be established. Included as offenses under this convention are
conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit genocide. 3 For
example, imposing measures calculated to prevent births with-
in a group and transferring children of the group to another
area can constitute violations within the meaning of the con-
vention if undertaken with the intent to bring about the
group's destruction.34
B. The Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal5
Although it is clear that the recent war in Rwanda was
not exclusively internal, it was primarily so. Accordingly, those
provisions in the Geneva Conventions applicable to interna-
tional armed conflict, i.e., all of the "grave breaches" provi-
sions, do not expressly govern. Moreover, as noted earlier, the
only bodies of law containing criminal sanctions which at least
facially apply to non-international armed conflict are the Geno-
cide Convention and the Nuremberg Charter's article 6(c)
which prohibits "crimes against humanity."36 The Genocide
Convention 7 applies in full force to the 1994 conflict in Rwan-
da. Moreover, U.N. legal experts have defined "crimes against
humanity" as:
[Giross violations of fundamental rules of humanitarian and
human rights law committed by persons demonstrably linked
to a party to the armed conflict, as part of an official policy
based on discrimination against an identifiable group of per-
sons, irrespective of war and the nationality of the victim,
and includes acts such as the following-
Murder;
Extermination;
Enslavement;
33. Id. arts. 11.II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280-81.
34. Id. art. IL 78 U.N.T.S. at 280-81.
35. Subject matter jurisdiction is contained in the statute of the tribunal
which is set out in the Security Council resolution establishing the tribunal. Stat-
ute of the Rwandan Tribunal, supra note 4.
36. Although the Nuremberg Tribunal interpreted article 6(c) to relate only to
offenses committed during the course of World War H, post-Nuremberg develop-
ments indicate that the offense "crimes against humanity" applies both in inter-
national and in non-international armed conflict and "irrespective of the war and
the nationality of the victim." Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda,
supra note 10, % 135 (articulating the Rwandan Commission's definition of "crimes
against humanity").
37. See supra notes 17, 24.
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Deportation and population transfer;
Imprisonment;
Torture;
Rape;
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
Other inhuman acts;
Apartheid."
U.N. jurisprudential experts have accepted that common
article 3, (the prohibitions of which substantially overlap with
those of article 6(c)) of the Nuremberg Charter, applies also."m
Supplementing common article 3 are various provisions of
Protocol II under the Geneva Conventions;4  Protocol H being
the instrument intended to expressly govern non-international
armed conflict.
Specifically, article 4 of Protocol H renders unlawful with
respect to those who are hors de combat the following: murder;
cruel treatment; any kind of corporal punishment; collective
punishments and the taking of hostages; acts of terrorism;
humiliating and degrading treatment (e.g., enforced prostitu-
tion and any form of assault); slavery; pillage; and threats to
commit any of the foregoing acts.41 Similarly, article 13 pro-
vides that the civilian population shall not be the subject of
attack,42 while article 14 extends similar protection to objects
38. Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda, supra note 10, % 135.
The official policy of discrimination must be based on ethnic, racial, religious,
national or political grounds. Statute of the Rwandan Tribunal, supra note 4, art.
3. This approach was based on the definition offered by the Commission of Ex-
perts for Yugoslavia. See Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, su.
pra note 9, 22.
39. Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda, supra note 10, at 23,
discussing the common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Common article 3 and
Protocol H1 were specifically included in the Rwanda tribunal's jurisdictional base
in the tribunal's statute. Statute of the Rwandan Tribunal, supra note 4, art. 5.
Common article 3 contains no express criminal sanctions provisions making viola-
tion of its provisions a "grave breach" and just how it is to be made applicable is
left in mystery by the Commission of Experts. As will be discussed at greater
length in part IV.E of this paper, however, common article 3 has a bearing on
universal jurisdiction in that it embraces a body of jus cogens norms, violations of
which may constitute international crimes.
40. Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda, supra note 10, 5 110.
Like common article 3, Protocol H contains no express criminal sanctions provi-
sion. See generally Protocol II, supra note 5.
41. Protocol I1, supra note 5, art. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 612.
42. Id. art. 13(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
120 [Vol. =XI:I1
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necessary for civilian survival.43 Article 17 forbids the forced
displacement of the civilian population except in the interests
of civilian safety or for "imperative military reasons. '
Moreover, Protocol II develops and clarifies the "affirma-
tive" responsibilities of the parties to the conflict contained in
common article 3. Articles 5, 7 and 9, for instance, mandate
that those who have been removed from active fighting receive
"humane treatment" including medical care and proper hy-
giene; that there be no distinction among those receiving such
aid except on medical grounds; and that "protected persons"
shall be allowed to practice their religion.45
III. THE VIOLATIONS
This section analyzes the putative violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law which have taken place in Yugoslavia
and Rwanda with specific reference to the above-cited provi-
sions of international criminal law. The sources for the find-
ings of probable violation are the following reports of the U.N.
body of experts impanelled to elucidate the law and the facts
in each case: (i) the Final Report of the Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780;46
and (ii) the Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission
of Experts Established in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 935.47
A. International Humanitarian Law Violations in Yugoslavia
By way of preface, it is important to note that, whereas
the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia has concluded that
the war in the former Yugoslavia is primarily of an interna-
tional character, it actually is informed with characteristics of
both internal and international armed conflict. A short compar-
ison of the dates of the actual events and the time span form-
ing the basis of the tribunal's jurisdiction is sufficient to make
43. Id. art. 14, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
44. Id. art. 17(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 612-14; see also Report of the Commission
of Experts for Rwanda, supra note 10, at 22-25.
45. Protocol II, supra note 5, arts. 5, 7, 9, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 612-14; see also
Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 9, at 22-25.
46. Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 9, at 3.
47. Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda, supra note 10, 9 1.
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this essential point.
The tribunal's jurisdiction extends to international human-
itarian law violations taking place in the former Yugoslavia
since January 1991.48 At that time, however, Yugoslavia was
still an integrated sovereign state recognized as such by the
international community. Disintegration began with the sepa-
ration of Slovenia on June 25, 1991, which was followed by a
unilateral declaration of independence by Croatia on June 29,
1991. Although both separations occasioned fighting, the decla-
ration of independence by Croatia brought about substantial
resistance on the part of the Serbs and many of the interna-
tional humanitarian law violations to be considered by the
tribunal arose in the ensuing Serb/Croat armed contest.49
The Croat separation was then followed by that of Bosnia-
Herzegovina on March 6, 1992.0 Armed conflict ensued which
was carried out, on the Serb side, by paramilitary units con-
sisting of Bosnian Serbs on the one hand and regular forces of
the Yugoslav Popular Army (JNA) on the other.5 As of June
1992, however, the JNA professes to have withdrawn from the
conflict leaving the fighting entirely in the hands of Bosnian
paramilitary groups such as Arken's "Tigers" and Sesel's
'"hite Eagles" (commonly called "Chetniks").52 The net effect
of the JNA's claimed withdrawal from the fighting is to restore
the hostilities, as of June 1992, once again to the status of
internal armed conflict.
The violations within Yugoslavia can be divided into two
general categories. The first classification falls under the broad
heading of human rights violations which are infractions of the
fundamental norms protected by: the Nuremberg Charter,5 3
the "grave breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions,5 4
the Genocide Convention,5 and common article 3.V6 The sec-
ond type of violation flows more from the provisions of Protocol
48. Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 9, at 7.
49. Id. at 29-33.
50. Id. at 30.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 6, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S.
at 288-89.
54. See supra note 17.
55. Genocide Convention, supra note 7.
56. See supra note 24.
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I regulating the manner in which armed conflict is to be
waged.5"
The Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia has determined
that, since January 1991, the Serbs have pursued a policy of
"ethnic cleansing" against other ethnic and religious groups
within the former Yugoslavia." The violators have sought to
achieve their objective, moreover, by means of murder, torture,
and rape; mass deportations; confinement in ghetto areas; and
deliberate attacks on the civilian population and civilian prop-
erty.59 The Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugosla-
via (Yugoslavia Report) annotates some arresting incidents of
the policy of ethnic cleansing in action.
Among other things, the Yugoslavia Report sets forth
actual events in which the entire civilian population of an
important region, consisting of approximately 47,000 persons,
was evacuated in the wake of a significant military attack
against a substantially undefended location." In the deporta-
tions which followed the evacuation, the Serbs segregated their
captives into two groups: one consisting of women, elderly men,
and boys, the other of comparatively young men. The two
groups were then bused off to separate concentration camps
where each suffered intense humanitarian abuse. The object of
this wholesale attack, according to U.N. findings, was the de-
struction of the non-Serbian leadership in the area."'
The conditions maintained in the camps are characterized
by large scale humanitarian law violations, including "killing,
torture and rape." 2 Those persons targeted for punishment
are often prominent members of the ethnic community under
attack.63 Rape has also been used by the Serbs as an instru-
ment of policy, being deployed in order to promote shame and
suffering in the victim as part of the perpetrators' overall dis-
placement plan. The victims of this policy have been essen-
tially the Bosnian Moslems.64
57. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 85(3)-(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 42.
58. Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 9, a% 129-
150.
59. Id.
60. Id. %a 163-167.
61. Id. %% 168-173.
62. Id. 228-229.
63. Id. 230(k).
64. Id. 251.
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These violations quite clearly entail the broadest possible
use of the tribunal's jurisdictional base. The deliberate imposi-
tion of suffering as part of a policy to eliminate an ethnic or
religious group quite clearly falls within the Genocide Conven-
tion. Moreover, to the degree that these acts constitute inhu-
man conduct such as violence to life and person, murder, hu-
miliating treatment, torture, and mass deportations, they
would both fall within the "grave breaches" provisions of the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I (if committed during inter-
national armed conflict), and constitute colorable violations of
article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter (if committed in civil
war).65 Whether the conflict is international or non-interna-
tional in character is largely irrelevant where these kinds of
violations are concerned.
Also included within the probable violations noted by the
Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia are the following:
(i) The siege of Sarajevo which commenced on April 5, 1992.
The strongly civilian character of the targets impacted and
the disproportionate number of shells actually launched
against the City on a daily basis (200 to 1,000) indicate a
violation of article 85(3) of Protocol I prohibiting both a delib-
erate attack against civilians and any attack wherein the
resulting injury to civilians and civilian property would be
excessive.6"
(ii) The Serbian bombardment of the City of Dubrovnik in
Croatia by the JNA during 1991 through 1993. The loss of
the City constituted a considerable historical calamity and its
military significance was non-existent. The Commission of
Experts has indicated that the bombardment constitutes a
deliberate attack against civilians and their property in vio-
lation of article 85(3) of Protocol IL'
(iii) The destruction of the Mostar Bridge in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1993, probably by Croat soldiers acting on
their own initiative. The Bridge was a cultural link between
Muslim and Croat communities in Bosnia.68
65. Nevertheless, as will be developed in part IV of this paper, a restrictive
interpretation of crimes against humanity (i.e., one requiring that violations be
pursuant to an "official policy of discrimination") may have an undesirable delimit-
ing effect on subject matter jurisdiction in this respect.
66. Id. %a 188-194; see also Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 85(3), 1125 U.N.T.S.
at 42.
67. Id. %J 298-301; see also Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 85(3), 1125 U.N.T.S.
at 42.
68. Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 9, 295-
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Some of the military misconduct discussed above may well
fall into that class of violation which is subject to the tribunal's
jurisdiction only in the event that it determines the war in
Yugoslavia to be of an international character. This character-
ization would be true, for instance, of attacks involving legiti-
mate military targets where the resulting damage to civilians
and civilian objects was disproportionate. Such activity, provid-
ed that it does not entail a direct attack on the civilian popula-
tion, arguably relates to the manner in which armed conflict is
waged and does not necessarily pertain to treatment of a "pro-
tected person" who is within the control of one of the warring
parties.
Accordingly, such violations may give rise to universal
jurisdiction only insofar as they are described in instruments
specifically governing international war. In this case, such
activity is proscribed in article 85(3) of Protocol I. To the de-
gree that such misconduct occurs during internal conflict and
does not involve the deliberate imposition of harm or suffering,
it may escape being treated as a violation either under article
6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter or under common article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions.69
297.
69. Compelling arguments have been advanced, however, to the effect that
common article 3 has incorporated the proportionality principle codified in article
85(3) of Protocol I so as to make the latter applicable in internal armed conflict.
See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW 34-36 (1989) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS]. The idea that the proportionality
rule applies in internal armed conflict by virtue of common article 3 (as supple-
mented by Protocol II) is itself supported by the Commentary to Protocol H:
It is appropriate to recall here the most important of these principles,
i.e., the principle to use the minimum force required to harm the enemy,
the principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality which only
intervene when it is not possible to ensure the total immunity of the
population:
- parties engaged in a conflict do not have an unlimited right as regards
the means injuring the enemy;
- a distinction should be made at all times between persons participating
in hostilities and the civilian population, so that the latter may be
spared as far as possible;
- the relation between the direct military advantage anticipated from an
attack and the harmful effects which could result on the persons and
objects protected should be considered in advance.
Sylvie-Stoyanka Junod, International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on
the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol H), in
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
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B. International Humanitarian Law Violations in Rwanda
The Security Council Resolution establishing the Rwandan
tribunal indicates that it is to consider international humani-
tarian law violations arising in Rwanda between January 1,
1994 and December 31, 1994."0 The findings of United Na-
tions experts are to the effect that massive violations of inter-
national humanitarian law, against members of the Tutsi tribe
or ethnic Hutus who were either moderate or who actually op-
posed the regime of Rwanda's former President, Juvenal
Habyarimana, have been committed within Rwanda."1 The
perpetrators have been mostly armed gangs trained by the
Presidential Guard (the interahamwe) and supported by the
Rwandese armed forces.72
The Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda
(Rwanda Report) has determined that numerous killings and
acts of torture and other cruel and degrading treatment have
been committed by the former Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)
army and extremist Hutus during 1994. The Rwanda Report
notes that the systematic nature of these killings has extended
back over many years. The years 1959, 1963, 1966, 1973, and
1990 through 1993 were periods of mass slaughter conducted
against members of the Tutsi tribe." In April 1994, however,
the former President, Juvenal Habyarimana together with
members of his entourage were killed when his plane was
attacked.74 This event served as the predicate for the large-
scale violations of international humanitarian law which fol-
lowed.75
According to the weight of the evidence reviewed by the
Committee of Experts for Rwanda, the mass exterminations of
Tutsis by Hutu elements were "committed with intent to de-
stroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group, as such" so as to constitute a prima facie violation of
the Genocide Convention. 76 Indeed, evidence consisting of au-
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 1449-50 (Y. Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter COMMENTARY TO PROTOCOL II].
70. Statute of the Rwandan Tribunal, supra note 31, art. I.
71. Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda, supra note 4, q 55.
72. Id. 65.
73. Id. 55.
74. Id. q 56.
75. Id. q% 56, 58.
76. Id. q1 58.
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dio tapes demonstrates the existence of Escadrons de la Mort
set up by the Habyarimana for the purpose of carrying out
exterminations." Within a few hours of the plane crash, a
"provisional government" was formed and barricades were
erected along certain major thoroughfares. Since April 1994,
more than 500,000 persons have lost their lives in Rwanda in
the ensuing slaughter."8
On April 7, 1994, members of the Presidential Guard went
to the homes of certain moderate political leaders and killed
them. 9 On April 8, a systematic slaughter of Tutsis was com-
menced by the Presidential Guard in Kigali. At this time road-
blocks had been set up and persons holding Tutsi national
identification cards were singled out and summarily execut-
ed."0 On April 9, this methodical killing was continued in
Kigali by the Rwandese military, now aided by the
interahamwe militia. Within the next week, an estimated
20,000 persons had been killed within Kigali by the Presiden-
tial Guard and militia.8 '
The Kigali killings set the pattern for others to follow.
According to a Human Rights Watch Report relied on by the
Rwandan Commission of Experts, the following are rough
statistics with respect to extra-judicial killings in Rwanda in
the wake of the death of Juvenal Habyarimana:
2,800 persons were killed in a church in Kinbungo; 6,000
Tutsis were killed in a church in Cyahinde; 4,000 were killed
in a church in Kibeho; 2,000 were killed in a parish in
Mibirizi; 4,000 were killed in Shanhi parish; sick patients in
the hundreds together with medical staff were killed in
Kigali and in Butare; 31 Tutsi orphans and 11 Red Cross
volunteers were killed in an orphanage in Butare; 88 stu-
dents were slain in their school in Gikongo."2
The obvious incentive for these crimes was the elimination
77. Id. The extra-judicial executions of Tutsis by Hutu elements was unques-
tionably facilitated by the former government's classification of Rwandese by ethnic
group. Such ethnic designation would have been indicated on each Rwandeses
national identity card. Id. 61.
78. Id. 92.
79. Id. 68.
80. Id. 69.
81. Id. % 72.
82. Id. 91 73.
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of the Tutsi population according to a pre-planned program.
The evidence at the disposal of the United Nations fact gather-
ers leads to the ineluctable conclusion that the Genocide Con-
vention has been openly and transparently violated.83 Al-
though this reduces the tribunal's reliance on its remaining
jurisdictional bases, it does not eliminate them. The mass
killings described in the Report of the Committee of Experts
for Rwanda quite clearly demonstrates violation of the
Nuremberg Charter in that these exterminations are the
equivalent of violations of fundamental human rights linked to
a policy of discrimination against an identifiable group of per-
sons.
8 4
IV. COMMENT ON THE LAW AND THE VIOLATIONS
As indicated earlier, the essential questions treated in this
discussion arise out of the fact that many of the violations
taking place within the former Yugoslavia and all of the viola-
tions taking place within Rwanda have occurred in an environ-
ment of non-international war. The "grave breaches" provisions
of the Geneva Conventions do not extend to military miscon-
duct in the context of internal armed conflict.
The U.N. legal experts have been unclear regarding the
scope of international penal jurisdiction, particularly in the
area of internal armed conflict. The Commission of Experts for
both Rwanda and Yugoslavia have given a highly restrictive
interpretation of "crimes against humanity" in article 6(c) of
the Nuremberg Charter limiting the tribunal's jurisdiction over
mass exterminations, deportations, enslavement, and other
cruel and inhuman acts perpetrated against civilians to mis-
conduct which is committed pursuant to an official policy of
discrimination.'
On the other hand, the Commission of Experts for Rwanda
has accepted the suggestion of the Commission of Experts for
Yugoslavia that common article 3 establishes criminal jurisdic-
tion over such offenses committed in time of civil war.8 6 How-
83. Id. 156; see also id. 50.
84. Id. 125-146.
85. Id. 135; Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note
9, % 84.
86. Report of the Commissions of Experts for Rwanda, supra note 10, J% 135-
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ever, neither the Yugoslavian nor the Rwandan Commissions
of Experts offers an explicit explanation of how article 3 is to
play a role in establishing international criminal jurisdiction"7
(common article 3 contains prohibitions practically identical to
those in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, but does not
require that violations be committed under an official policy of
discrimination). Furthermore, common article 3 does not con-
tain a criminal sanctions provision. That is, it is not a "grave
breach" giving rise to universal jurisdiction. Likewise, Protocol
II of the Geneva Conventions, which governs explicitly non-
international armed conflict, does not contain a criminal sanc-
tion provision.' Thus, the essential question raised is: to
what degree does universal criminal jurisdiction obtain with
respect to mass exterminations, deportations, enslavement,
and other cruel and inhuman acts committed during internal
armed conflict in the absence of an official policy based on
discrimination?
A. Criminalization of Common Article 3
The most dramatic development regarding the tribunals'
subject matter jurisdiction is the virtual criminalization of
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions by the U.N. Secu-
rity Council. As indicated, this development has been accepted
without explanation by the Rwandan Commission of Ex-
perts. 9 It should be noted that there has been considerable
movement in this direction, mostly with respect to the Yugosla-
vian tribunal, notwithstanding that doubts have begun to ma-
terialize regarding the exclusively "international" character of
the armed conflict taking place there.90
87. The Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, however, strongly
suggests that article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter and common article 3 to the
Geneva Conventions were co-extensive. Report of the Commission of Experts for
Yugoslavia, supra note 9, %1 81-83. This treatment is not carried over into the
Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda. Report of the Commission of
Experts for Rwanda, supra note 10, 125-146.
88. See generally Meron, supra note 11, at 127-28.
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
90. The internalfmternational war dichotomy of the two conflicts under discus-
sion gives rise to a number of questions regarding the "bases and ranges" of both
the Yugoslavian and the Rwandan war crimes tribunals' jurisdictional base. It
must be mentioned that these questions tend to have more bearing on the Yugo-
slavian tribunal. The extrajudicial killings within Rwanda have been so transpar-
ently based on a policy of discrimination toward a targeted ethnic group that they
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Among the arguments9' which have been developed in
favor of criminalization are:
(i) Article 3 of the statute of the Yugoslavian war crimes
tribunal empowering the tribunal to apply the "laws and
customs of war" embraces the customary law codified by
common article 3.
(ii) As evidence that it is included within the "laws and cus-
toms of war," common article 3 has been incorporated into
the municipal law of Yugoslavia and therefor it can be relied
on by the tribunal as a basis for its own criminal jurisdic-
tion. 2
The conclusion that common article 3 may give rise to
criminal jurisdiction has now gained acceptance in the war
crimes process. Among other things, the appeals court for the
Yugoslavian war crimes tribunal has ruled that individual
criminal responsibility is obtained under common article 3
with respect to serious breaches of customary rules and prin-
ciples on internal conflicts. 3 The opinion is careful to note,
however, that criminalizing serious violations of international
humanitarian law arising in internal armed conflict is "fully
warranted from the point of view of substantive justice and
satisfy both the Genocide Convention as well as the conservative interpretation of
the Nuremberg Chartefs "crimes against humanity" provision which has been
offered by United Nations' legal experts. The assessment, however, that the nature
of the Yugoslavian conflict is essentially international in nature may prove to be
misplaced. As previously noted, many of the violations would have occurred while
Yugoslavia was still a sovereign entity, and the violations taking place in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (by far the most serious) would have occurred after the JNA pro-
fessed withdrawal from that state relegating the conflict to the status of an essen-
tially civil war.
91. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development
of International Law, 88 AM. J. INTL L. 78 (1994).
92. Id. at 82-83. These two arguments are clearly related. Under the interpre-
tation offered, the "laws and customs of war" would include the entire body of
humanitarian law in force in the former Yugoslavia. Id. at 82. It should be noted
in this respect that it is not only the "grave breaches" which the Geneva Conven-
tions contemplate as criminal violations: the Conventions call upon the signatory
parties to adopt measures "suppressing" violations of the Conventions, other than
"grave breaches." See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 146, 6 U.S.T.
at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
93. Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in
the Matter of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, at 70 (Int'l Trib.
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991).
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equity."4 In this respect:
[Sluch violations were punishable under the Criminal Code of
the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and the law implement-
ing the two Additional Protocols of 1977. The same violations
have been made punishable in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina by virtue of the decree of 11 April 1992."5
The premise that a violation of any of the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions may provide the basis for international
penal jurisdiction as an infringement of the 'laws and customs
of war" is considerably enhanced by the overriding viewpoint of
the Commentary to the Conventions (Commentary) which is to
the effect that "[tihe Geneva Conventions form part of what is
called the laws and customs of war, violations of which are
commonly called war crimes." 6
The decision of the appellate tribunal that common article
3 confers criminal jurisdiction over serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law taking place in internal armed
conflict constitutes a dramatic step forward. The implicit limi-
tations in the court's ruling, however, must not be overlooked.
In this respect, express criminalization under municipal law
may be essential to avoid application of the nullum crimen sine
lege doctrine where crimes not entailing "grave breaches" or
violations of well-established customary rules are concerned.
Article 6(2) of Protocol II of the Geneva Convention provides
that "no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on
account of any act or omission which did not form a criminal
offence, under the law, at the time when it was committed."97
94. Id.
95. Id. at 70-71.
96. COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 583 (Oscar M. Vehlar & Henri Carsier eds.,
1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV].
97. Protocol II, supra note 5, art. 6(2)(c), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 614. Importantly,
the Commentary to Protocol I1 indicates that "crimes against humanity" would not
be precluded by the nullum crimen sine lege doctrine under article 6(2), but no
other body of customary international law is referred to for purposes of the excep-
tion. The Commentary to Protocol noted:
The reference to international law is mainly intended to cover crimes
against humanity. A breach of international law should not go unpun-
ished on the basis of the fact that the act or omission (failure to act)
concerned was not an offence under the national law at the time it was
committed.
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The tribunals for both Yugoslavia and Rwanda will have
to decide what scope they will give to the nullum crimen sine
lege doctrine. The Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, in
making recommendations on municipal legislation, takes con-
siderable pains to indicate that the legislation be as detailed as
possible and contain specific provisions dealing with penal-
ties.9" Elsewhere the Commentary cites with approval such
specific legislation as putting to rest entirely legitimate con-
cerns regarding the pernicious effect of retroactively applied
penal sanctions.9 The need for specific legislation is particu-
larly called for in the present circumstances in light of the
novelty of the idea that common article 3 embraces a criminal
standard.' The Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia had
earlier concluded that, if the war were exclusively non-inter-
national in character, only the Genocide Convention and article
6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter would clearly apply as confer-
ring universal jurisdiction.'
Accordingly, the only body of jurisprudence constituting
established precedent for finding criminal responsibility for
mass exterminations, deportations, enslavement, and other
cruel and inhuman acts committed during internal conflict
Junod, COMMENTARY TO PROTOCOL II, supra note 69, at 1400.
98. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 96, at 591.
99. Commentary DI provides that:
In Anglo-Saxon countries, the violation of a rule of international law,
whether explicit or customary, and even if that rule does not make provi-
sion for penal sanctions, entitles national tribunals to pass sentence. In
other countries, on the other hand, and in particular the countries of the
European continent, penal law, if it is to be applicable, must include not
only formal regulations but also provisions determining the nature and
severity of the penalty. In these latter countries, the maxim of nulla
poena sine lege remains fully valid.
COMMENTARY: I[ GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
OF WAR 618 (Frederic Siordet & Claude Pilloud eds., 1960).
100. The Report of the Secretary General to the Yugoslavian tribunal's statute
indicates that, in light of the nullum crimen sine lege doctrine, the tribunal should
only "apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt
part of customary law so that the problem of adherence by some but not all states
to specific conventions does not arise." Statute of the Yugoslavian Tribunal, supra
note 6, 34. That Report also notes that such customary law clearly embraces all
of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. Id. Nonetheless, the Report notes
that the Hague Convention, "as interpreted and applied by the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal," provides the basis for the article in the statute relating to the "laws and
customs of war." Id. 44. The Hague Convention relates only to wars of an inter-
national character.
101. Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 9, %1 42.
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continues to be article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, proscrib-
ing "crimes against humanity."' 2 Unlike common article 3,
"crimes against humanity" have not suddenly surfaced in the
war crimes process as constituting an independent basis for
individual criminal responsibility. More importantly, article
6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter does not depend for its enforce-
ment on the degree to which its standard has been adopted in
corresponding municipal legislation by the country in which
the international humanitarian law violations have putatively
taken place. Rather, the offense "crimes against humanity"
gives rise to universal jurisdiction over individual violators
without the need for such external references. In this way,
article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter provides a more vital
mechanism for setting precedent in the area of protecting hu-
man rights in internal armed conflict than does common article
3.
In this context, the United Nations restrictive reading of
article 6(c) becomes highly problematic. The conditions to its
reach, namely that criminal acts must be pursuant to an offi-
cial policy of discrimination, create a significant impediment to
proving that otherwise qualifying violations amount to crimi-
nally sanctionable activity. As concerns Yugoslavia, for in-
stance, there are findings that many of the violations in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (organization of the camps; cruel and
degrading treatment; rape as an instrument of policy) were for
the express purpose of punishing and in some instances, elimi-
nating, non-Serbian ethnic and religious groups. If such intent
were to be proven at trial, this finding would place the miscon-
duct in question squarely within the Nuremberg Charter's -
article 6(c), (as interpreted in this paper) and arguably within
the Genocide Convention. Nevertheless, the requirement that
the exterminations and other cruel and inhuman treatment be
pursuant to "an official policy of discrimination" adds an im-
portant evidentiary hurdle which may not be possible to meet
in every instance."3
102. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 6, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S.
at 288-89.
103. Perhaps of more importance, the jurisdictional limitation announced by the
Commission of Experts would delimit the jurisdictional competence of the Yugosla-
vian tribunal to try atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serbs under article 6(c) of
the Nuremberg Charter. According to the Commission of Experts, violations must
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B. Summary of Arguments Against Interpretation of "Crimes
Against Humanity" as Requiring an Official Policy of
Discrimination
As noted previously, this paper urges a construction of
article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter which would essentially
conflate the crimes identified in it with the substantive viola-
tions described in common article 3. The arguments supporting
this interpretation are set forth in detail below. In summary
form, they are as follows: first, the clear and unambiguous
language of article 6(c) indicates that no policy of discrimina-
tion is necessary for a violation to be established in connection
with murders, exterminations, deportations, and other cruel
and inhumane acts-such a qualification existing only with
respect to persecutions. Second, this interpretation is in confor-
mity with the history of both common article 3 and of article
6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter which indicates that these two
instruments were codifications of jus cogens norms. These
norms have been described by the International Court of Jus-
tice as "elementary considerations of humanity." °4 The sub-
stantive provisions of both "crimes against humanity" and
common article 3 reveal that they are directly derived from
customary law relating to "war crimes," principles which are
now codified in the "grave breaches" provisions of the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949. These provisions, which are
jus cogens, do not themselves require a policy of discrimination
to be present to confer universal jurisdiction.
Finally, since the core offenses underlying crimes against
humanity and common article 3 are jus cogens, violators of
these fundamental norms may, in appropriate circumstances,
be made the subject of universal jurisdiction, even in the ab-
sence of convention, on the theory that the perpetrators have
rendered themselves hostes humani generis. A plain meaning
interpretation which gives plenary effect to the peremptory
norms underlying article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter and
be pursuant to an official policy of discrimination, implying that some state action
is required. Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 9,
84. If the Bosnian Serbs were acting on their own, however, and without any
overt or covert encouragement from Belgrade, it is hard to see how crimes within
the meaning of article 6(c) (as interpreted) could be established.
104. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 105
(June 27).
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common article 3 is to be preferred to an interpretation which
departs from the unambiguous language of the provisions so as
to derogate from these jus cogens norms.
C. A Plain Meaning Interpretation of Article 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter
The Rwandan Commission of Experts, in commenting on
the scope of article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, devoted
considerable time to explaining the genealogy of "crimes
against humanity." This genealogy makes it apparent that the
Nuremberg tribunal considered article 6(c) as being specifically
related only to war crimes and not as providing an indepen-
dent jurisdictional basis which could cover offenses not arising
in the course of World War IH.1°5 The Rwandan Report indi-
cates that the post-Nuremberg history of the provision reveals
clearly that article 6(c) may be applied in a non-international
context. However, the Rwandan Report, citing the earlier Com-
mission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia, concludes that
"crimes against humanity" are limited to mass exterminations
and other inhuman acts which are predicated on an official
policy of persecution or discrimination." 6 Such a reading, it
is submitted, is undesirable in a number of respects.0 7
A plain meaning construction of the text of article 6(c)
indicates that the words "on political, racial, or religious
grounds" were not intended to modify the initial offenses set
out in article 6(c) (i.e., murder, extermination, enslavement,
etc.), but only the antecedent "persecutions."' In 1954, the
105. Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda, supra note 10, I 128-
130.
106. Id. 134 (citing the Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia,
supra note 9, 84).
107. For the view that post-Nuremberg developments have not embraced all of-
fenses included in the text of article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, and most
particularly mass exterminations not undertaken pursuant to an official policy of
discrimination or persecution, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANI-
TY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 470-71 (1992).
108. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties should be
interpreted in accordance with the clear meaning of their terms and recourse
should be had to the travaux preparatoires only in the event of ambiguity or to
resolve confusion. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts.
31-32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Although the rules
of the Vienna Convention do not expressly govern in that the Nuremberg Charter
is not a treaty or convention in the customary sense, the Vienna rules should,
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International Law Commission (ILC) adopted one of its several
codifications of the term "crimes against humanity.""9 The
definition contained in Article 2(11) of the 1954 Draft Code of
Offenses (Draft Code) was the following:
Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation or persecutions, committed against any civilian
population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural
grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individu-
als acting at the instigation or with the toleration of the au-
thorities.1
The Draft Code of Offenses became subject to strong schol-
arly criticism. Most importantly, D.H.N. Johnson, in commen-
tary which retains currency today as far as interpretation of
article 6(c) is concerned,' was of the view that it was an un-
desirable restriction on the clear wording of the Nuremberg
Charter to confine "inhumane acts" to the requirement that
they be committed on social, cultural, political or racial
nonetheless, apply by analogy. This is so because "crimes against humanity," like
treaty law, has a textual foundation. The offenses deemed to be "crimes against
humanity" clearly derive from a written international agreement-the Nuremberg
Charter-between major warring powers, the principles of which were later unani-
mously approved by the United Nations General Assembly and so became a part
of general international law. For a history of the Nuremberg Charter in this re-
spect, see J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 411 (1963).
109. See generally Report of the 1LC to the General Assembly, [1954] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 150, U.N. Doc. A/2673.
110. Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N.
GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, art. 2(11), U.N. Doc. A12693 (1954). The ILC has
historically been concerned with distinguishing between those offenses which are
properly classed as international crimes by states and criminal acts by individuals
which give rise to universal jurisdiction. Accordingly:
[t]he ILC observed that in adopting the designation "international crime",
the Commission intends only to refer to acts attributable to the State as
such. Once again it wishes to sound a warning against any confusion
between the expression "international crime" as used in . . . article [19 of
the ILC's draft articles on state responsibility (part one)) and similar
expressions such as "crime under international law", "war crime", and
"crime against humanity", etc., which are used in a number of conven-
tions and international instruments to designate certain heinous individu-
al crimes for which those instruments require States to punish the guilty
persons adequately.
MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 69, at 210 n.226 (1989) (quoting [1976] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 119, UN Doc. EICN.4/SERA/1976/Add.1).
ill. See generally D.H.N. Johnson, Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind, 4 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 445 (1955).
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grounds. Under the Nuremberg Charter, Johnson maintained,
it was only "persecutions" which were required to be commit-
ted on "political, racial or religious" grounds. Johnson's evident
concern on this point, which is the principal concern of this
paper, was that the Draft Code, by conditioning "inhumane
acts" in the same way as "persecutions," thereby created a
heightened burden of proof for establishing "inhumane acts"
which, under the Nuremburg Charter, exists only for "persecu-
tions.""2
Johnson was equally critical of the requirement that there
be state action or involvement before prosecutions of individu-
als could be initiated. Johnson pointed to the provisions of the
Genocide Convention"' which indicate unequivocally that an
individual can be held responsible "under any circumstanc-
es.""' This highly salient criticism reveals the underlying
weakness of the construction of "crimes against humanity"
which mandates that violations of article 6(c) be pursuant to
an "official policy of discrimination" or requires formal state ac-
tion. Such an interpretation upsets the fundamental parallel-
ism existing between "crimes against humanity" and genocide
and shows conclusively why individuals can be held criminally
responsible for violations of fundamental human rights in the
absence of a formal state integument.
That the interpretation offered by Johnson of "crimes
against humanity" was in conformity both with the clear lan-
guage of article 6(c) and with the understanding of those who
drafted the document now seems ineluctable. A recent treatise
on the Yugoslavian war crimes process quotes with approval
the following language from an authoritative history of the
Nuremberg Charter and Judgment:
It might perhaps be argued that the phrase 'on political,
racial or religious grounds' refers not only to persecutions but
also to the first type of crimes against humanity. The British
Chief Prosecutor possibly held that opinion as he spoke of
'murder, extermination, enslavement, persecution on political,
racial or economic grounds.' This interpretation, however,
hardly seems to be warranted by the English wording and
still less by the French text .... Moreover, in its statement
112. Id. at 465.
113. Genocide Convention, supra note 7, art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280-81.
114. Johnson, supra note 111, at 465.
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with regard to von Schirach's guilt the Court designated the
crimes against humanity as 'murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, and other inhumane acts' and 'persecu-
tions on political, racial or religious grounds.'"
The interpretation that "crimes against humanity" re-
quires state action, and specifically a state policy of discrimina-
tion, has been supported by eminent publicists, including M.
Cherif Bassiouni."6 It is important to note, however, that
Bassiouni does not find such an interpretation grounded in the
language of article 6(c). On the contrary, Bassiouni maintains
that the need for state action flows from a dichotomy between
those crimes which fall exclusively under municipal criminal
jurisprudence and those which possess some nexus to the in-
ternational community which justifies the latter in treating
them as criminal violations." 7 Thus the crimes of murder,
enslavement and torture are crimes under most of the world's
criminal codes; accordingly, they would be punishable primari-
ly under municipal law. Some "international element" is neces-
sary to subject these acts to universal jurisdiction, and this
Bassiouni finds in state action or policy. Specifically, the au-
thor writes:
The prerequisite legal element discussed above [state action
or policy] is, therefore, indispensable to the legal nature of
"crimes against humanity," and must be established before
an international criminal charge can be brought against an
alleged perpetrator. This becomes particularly important
since Post-Charter Legal Developments have removed the
connection between "crimes against humanity" and "crimes
against the peace" or "war crimes." In the absence of such a
link to internationally prohibited conduct, "crimes against
humanity" becomes less viable as an international crime
115. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTA-
RY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 74 n.236 (1995) (citing THE CHARTER AND JUDGEMENT
OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 67 (1949)). Despite the
evident intent of the framers and the clear language in the text, the United
States took the position that "crimes against humanity" had to be committed on
"national, political, ethnic, racial, gender or religious grounds." Id. The interpreta-
tion ultimately adopted by the Commission of Experts was in substantial conformi-
ty with the United States position.
116. See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 107, at 470-71.
117. Id. at 247.
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unless another link joins it to the valid sphere of interna-
tional criminalization." '
Yet, the author does not clarify why state action or policy
provides the only acceptable link to the international communi-
ty which would repose in the latter an interest in enforcement.
Moreover, such an approach implies that fundamental human
rights must be violated by the sovereign for international crim-
inal jurisdiction to be obtained. Such interpretation clearly
contradicts the plain meaning of the Genocide Convention
under which an individual can be held responsible "under any
circumstances,"'19 irrespective of whether there is a state pol-
icy of discrimination. The construction also runs counter to the
spirit and letter of common article 3 which applies pari passu
to violations by the government and by the insurgents
alike.1
20
The requirement of state action as applied to "crimes
against humanity" conflates principles of international crimi-
nal jurisdiction where individual criminal responsibility is
concerned, with principles regarding how such responsibility
on the part of the state or its agents is asserted. Universal
jurisdiction over the latter type of offense always requires a
state policy pursuant to which individual violations are accom-
plished,121 whereas jurisdiction over the former generally
does not.
As will be developed at greater length in Part IV.D of this
paper, individual criminal responsibility historically was ob-
tained over those acts which the international community
118. Id. at 261.
119. See Genocide Convention, supra note 7, art. IV, 72 U.N.T.S. at 280-81;
Johnson, supra note 111, at 465.
120. As noted above, the appellate tribunal overseeing the Yugoslavian war
crimes process has resolved that common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions may
be criminally enforced, its conclusion being based, at least in part, on the premise
that common article 3 codifies customary law. No objection to the applicability of
common article 3 appears to have been lodged in the appeal to the effect that the
provisions of article 3 would govern in the absence of a State involvement, i.e.,
would apply to violations committed by the insurgents. See Decision on the De-
fence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Matter of Prosecutor
v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, at 49-71 (Int!l Trib. for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991).
121. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights,
80 AM. J. I'L L. 1, 15 (1986).
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viewed as heinous and as inherently inimical to its collective
well-being, even in the absence of treaty or other international
agreement. The Commission of Experts for Rwanda was keenly
aware of this distinction in its report which makes its adoption
of a state action requirement all the more problematic. Specifi-
cally, the Commission of Experts for Rwanda found:
The attribution of responsibility to the individual in propria
personam is not entirely new. Indeed, military trials of indi-
viduals for having committed war crimes date back to at
least 1419, as Keen documents in his work The Laws of War
in the Middle Ages. There is also the international trial of
Peter von Hagenbach, which took place in 1474 for acts that
today are considered crimes against humanity. International
legal norms stipulating individual responsibility for slave-
trading and slave-trafficking and for piracy arose out of the
Congress of Vienna in 1815. Today these norms are consid-
ered part of customary international law and probably of jus
cogens.122
In short, the interpretation of article 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter put forward by Bassiouni (and apparently
accepted by the Commission of Experts for both Rwanda and
Yugoslavia) fails to take into account the misconduct of social
and military aggregates which, although they lack sovereignty
in the formal sense, wield power of such magnitude that they
affect the community of states in a more than incidental way.
These are the characteristics of armed insurgencies, such as
the one now extant within Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the
rebels have committed the greater proportion of human rights
violations in the conflict.
Two elements other than the existence of state action or
policy are recommended by Bassiouni for determining whether
a given offense should constitute an international crime. These
are: (i) the extent of the collective victimizations caused by the
violations; and (ii) the "impossibility of preventing, controlling
or suppressing the conduct in question which necessitates its
international criminalization."12
The foregoing considerations are more appropriately ap-
plied in situations of internal armed conflict since they ignore
122. Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda, supra note 10, 169.
123. BASSIOUNI, supra note 107, at 260.
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the requirement of state action or policy and concentrate on
the substance of the violation itself. Under these criteria,
moreover, the violations must have risen to a certain level of
intensity before international jurisdiction can be invoked. The
effect of this requirement is to equate the level of violence
needed for international jurisdiction over human rights viola-
tions with that normally prevailing during time of civil war. It
should be noted in this respect that there is no clear definition
in common article 3 as to what constitutes a war which is of a
non-international character. 24 Accordingly, an interpretation
of article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter which conditions uni-
versal jurisdiction on a certain level of human rights violations
would tend to bring "crimes against humanity" into conformity
with the essential precondition to jurisdiction under common
article 3: the widespread social destabilization caused by civil
war.
A third element could easily replace the requirement of
"state action or policy" in addition to the other two require-
ments to complete the criteria for international
criminalization: the degree to which the misconduct over which
international jurisdiction is sought has become repugnant in
the public conscience as based on the state of public interna-
tional law. Of critical concern in this respect is the text of the
Martens Clause contained in the preambles to the Hague Con-
ventions of 1907:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been is-
sued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to de-
clare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted
by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of
nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates
of the public conscience.'25
124. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 96, at 35. It was
thought best to leave the definition vague.
125. Hague Convention, supra note 8, pmbl. 8, 36 Stat. at 279-80. For a
discussion of the effects of the Martens clause on interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols, and on the Law of Geneva as a whole, see generally
Shigeki Miyazaki, The Martens Clause and International Humanitarian Law, in
STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRIN-
CIPLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET 433 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984).
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It is submitted in this connection that extrajudicial mur-
ders, torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, deportations and
enslavements committed under conditions of significant inter-
nal upheaval are, in contemplation of international law, of
such an unconscionable nature that perpetrators of these
crimes are viewed as hostes humani generis irrespective of
whether the violators are the sovereign state or the insurgents.
Critical in making the determination of whether the miscon-
duct in question offends the conscience of mankind and the
dictates of humanity is whether the activity involved offends a
jus cogens norm."
As will be developed at greater length in Part IV.D. of this
paper, not only have the core offenses of common article 3
which overlap with those contained in article 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter been identified as peremptory norms, they
also have been determined by the International Court of Jus-
tice to be "elementary considerations of humanity" in language
clearly intended to mirror the provisions of the Martens
Clause." This determination, and the opinion of scholars
discussed in the sections which follow, establish conclusively
that the offenses contained in common article 3 and article 6(c)
of the Nuremberg Charter are violations of peremptory norms
which should be classed as international crimes under the
criterion listed above, particularly that the acts proscribed are
violations of fundamental human rights, given the state of
opinio juris, and thus offend the usages of civilized peoples and
the conscience of mankind.
Based on the foregoing, U.N. legal scholars, once having
determined that the Nuremberg Charter had been construed to
extend both to internal as well as international armed conflict,
ought to have given article 6(c) an interpretation which was
consistent with its plain or facial meaning. Such an approach
would most clearly have given actual significance to the words
used and would have avoided a construction under which
"crimes against humanity" becomes a clear distortion of the
unambiguous language appearing in the text. The clear lan-
guage of article 6(c) does not require official action of any kind.
Furthermore, article 6(c) unambiguously conditions only perse-
126. Miyazaki, supra note 125, at 436-39.
127. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 105
(June 27).
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cutions by a policy of discrimination, giving rise to a construc-
tion that none of the other offenses listed in article 6(c) is so
limited: Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
D. Prohibition of "Crimes against Humanity" and Common
Article 3 as "Elementary Dictates of Humanity"
At the outset of this discussion, it is imperative to note the
direction which the war crimes process has taken as a whole.
The statute for the Yugoslavia tribunal quite clearly defined
"crimes against humanity" in broad terms and without the
requirement that the violation be pursuant to an official policy
of discrimination." Apparently following the definition given
in the Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia,
however, the statute of the Rwandan tribunal adopted a more
restrictive interpretation of article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Char-
ter, i.e., that "crimes against humanity," to constitute viola-
tions, had to be committed on "national, political, ethnic, racial
or religious grounds."29 Thus, while not requiring an "official
128. Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note 16, art. 5. Article five pro-
vides that:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute per-
sons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed con-
flict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against
any civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
Id.
129. Statute of the Rwandan Tribunal, supra note 4, art. 3. Article three pro-
vides that:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to
prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation;
(e) Imprisonment;
() Torture;
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policy" of discrimination, as is set forth in the Reports of the
Commission of Experts for both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the
statute of the Rwandan tribunal evidently mandates that
"crimes against humanity" be committed pursuant to a system-
atized pattern of discrimination.
Consistent with the foregoing evolution towards an ever
more restrictive construction of article 6(c), the interpretation
of "crimes against humanity" which is published in the Rwan-
da Report constitutes something of a departure from the defini-
tion provided in the Yugoslavia Report."'° In the latter re-
port, the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia acceded that,
to constitute violations of the Nuremberg Charter, the mass
exterminations of civilians and other inhuman conduct had to
be widespread and systematic as well as pursuant to a plan of
"persecution or discrimination."13 Yet, the same report main-
tains that the prohibitions of article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter, like common article 3 and the "grave breaches" provi-
sions of the Geneva Conventions, are "mere codification of
elementary dictates of humanity."1 32 Because of its impor-
tance to the scope of "crimes against humanity," the Yugoslavi-
an Commission's rationale in developing the relationship be-
tween article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter on the one hand,
and common article 3 (together with relevant provisions of
Protocol II) on the other, will be set out in full below:
In the context of crimes against humanity, it is relevant to
observe that the same kind of prohibited acts listed in com-
mon article 3 (relevant conflicts not of an international char-
(g) Rape;
(h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) Other inhumane acts.
Id.
130. Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 9, %% 81-
83.
131. Id. The Yugoslavia Commission, however, offered some guidance as to
what it meant by a common plan of persecution or discrimination:
Crimes against humanity are not confined to situations where there ex-
ists an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such, which are preconditions for genocide. Crimes
against humanity are, however, serious international violations directed
against protected persons, in contradistinction to a fate befalling them
merely as a side-effect, for example, of a military operation dictated by
military necessity.
Id. 9 83.
132. Id.
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acter) in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and in Proto-
col II to the Geneva Conventions are mere codifications of
elementary dictates of humanity. Article 3 prohibits "violence
to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrag-
es upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment; and the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgement pro-
nounced by a regularly constituent court, affording all of the
juridical guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples." Article 4 bans "violence to the life, health
and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular
murder, as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutila-
tion or any form of corporal punishment; collective punish-
ment; taking of hostages; acts of terrorism; outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of inde-
cent assaults; slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
pillage; and threats to commit any of the foregoing acts."188
The history of both common article 3 and of article 6(c) of
the Nuremberg Charter reflect that these instruments have a
common source, and that both instruments were intended as
codifications of norms previously applicable only to situations
of international armed conflict. Like "crimes against humani-
ty," common article 3 was designed to make these norms appli-
cable internally so as to effect relations within the state exist-
ing between sovereign and citizen."'
Bassiouni gives a short history of the provisions of article
6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter and their direct derivation from
133. Id. 82. Indeed, if it was not the intent of the Commission of Experts for
Yugoslavia to extend this fundamental policy under common article 3 of the Gene-
va Conventions to "crimes against humanity," it is difficult to understand why the
Commission of Experts took such pains to examine article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter in the light of the prohibitions of common article 3 and Protocol I. More-
over, requiring an official policy of discrimination or persecution as a predicate of
universal jurisdiction for such offenses as mass exterminations would necessarily
have the effect of ousting from jurisdiction inhuman conduct committed by insur-
gents who, by definition cannot be acting pursuant to any such State-controlled
plan of action. This would have considerable effect on the war crimes process in
the former Yugoslavia since, after the withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia-
Herzegovina in mid-1992, the main offenders have been the Bosnian Serbs who
are in the posture of insurgents.
134. See, e.g., JEAN PIcTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUALANITARIAN LAW 47 (1985); BASSIOUNI, supra note 107, at 177-78.
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"war crimes" as theretofore established under international
customary law."3 Specifically, "murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation and other inhumane acts against any
civilian population" had, at the time that article 6(c) was
adopted, been rendered unlawful by a variety of international
instruments if committed by a belligerent power against the
civilian population of another warring state.136 These norms,
derived from the customary law of war, were specifically drawn
upon in framing the "crimes against humanity" provisions of
the Nuremberg Charter. In his Report to the President of the
United States, Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson referred to the
proscriptions in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter in the
following way: "[tihese principles ... result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity
and the dictates of the public conscience." 7
On the other hand, common article 3 similarly derives
from the same fundamental norms which were originally appli-
cable in international armed conflict. Jean Pictet has summa-
rized the interesting compromise which resulted in adoption of
common article 3.138 Opponents to the idea of creating a legal
regime to govern internal armed conflict took the position that,
by applying humanitarian law to civil wars, a state would
render vulnerable its own sovereignty and security. The result
would be an open door to those advocating rebellion and anar-
chy; it would elevate insurgents to the status of warring states
and so inhibit lawful government in the legitimate repression
of insurgency.
The solution was to distinguish between "fundamental"
provisions of the Geneva Conventions (those applicable "in all
circumstances") from the other provisions which the parties
could adopt by means of special agreement. Only the former
provisions, those pertaining to what are now called "grave
breaches" in the Geneva Conventions, would be applied to
internal armed conflict. These are the very norms determined
to be jus cogens and "elementary considerations of humanity"
135. BASSIOUNI, supra note 107, at 177-78.
136. Id. at 178.
137. Id. at 178-79 (citing REPORT OF CHIEF PROSECUTOR ROBERT L. JACKSON
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 51 (June 7, 1945)). This statement was an
unambiguous reference to the Martens clause.
138. JEAN PICTET, HUMANITARiAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF THE VICTIMS
OF WAR 58 (1973).
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by the International Court of Justice."9
The writings of Jean Pictet are even more forceful in show-
ing the clear link between the Martens Clause underpinnings
of "crimes against humanity" and the jus cogens nature of
common article 3. Pictet has described the core norms underly-
ing common article 3 as: "the rudiments of humanity, a mini-
mum applicable at all times, in all places and circumstanc-
es ... part of the customs of peoples from which none may
disengage himself."'4 °
Hence, both instruments have a common source in the
customary law of war. Because common article 3 and "crimes
against humanity" were relevant to the relationship between
the state and its citizens, however, both achieved direct associ-
ation with human rights law. In this respect, the London Inter-
national Assembly, in formulating the need for article 6(c),
indicated that prosecuting such offenses would recognize a
minimum standard for mankind the observance of which would
be essential for the survival of the human species.14 The
U.N. War Crimes Commission subsequently noted the need to
prosecute those who committed "attacks on the fundamental
liberties and constitutional rights of people and individual per-
sons."
142
Like "crimes against humanity," common article 3 was
similarly viewed as protecting fundamental human rights in
internal armed conflict. Nowhere are the human rights impli-
cations of common article 3 more arrestingly made than in
Protocol II of the Geneva Convention, applicable to internal
wars, and intended to supplement common article 3. The Pre-
amble of Protocol II emphasizes that international human
rights constitute a basic protection of the human person in
non-international armed conflict.' Commentary to Protocol
II indicates the following with respect to the relationship be-
139. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 .C.J. 4, 105
(June 27).
140. JEAN PICTET, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUiIrNITARIAN LAW 26 (1966).
141. BASSIOUNI, supra note 107, at 179-80 (citing LONDON INTERNATIONAL As-
SEMBLY, THE PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LONDON
INTERNATIONAL ASSEMBLY 9 (1948)).
142. Id. at 180 (citing UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAWS OF WAR 192-93 (1948)).
143. Protocol II, supra note 5, pmbl., 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
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tween international human rights and the humanitarian law
generally, with specific reference to the provisions applicable to
internal armed conflict:
This irreducible core of human rights, also known as "non-
derogable rights," corresponds to the lowest level of protection
which can be claimed by anyone at any time. Protocol II
contains virtually all the irreducible rights of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which constitute the basic pro-
tection mentioned in the paragraph under consideration here.
These rights are based on rules of universal validity to which
States can be held, even in the absence of a treaty obligation
or any explicit commitment on their part. It may be accepted
that they form a part of jus cogens. This view may be con-
troversial for some of these rights, but there is no doubt
whatsoever as regards, for example, the prohibition of slavery
and torture, even without entering a discussion whether jus
cogens exists at all."'
Neither international humanitarian law applicable to
armed conflict, nor the "crimes against humanity" provisions of
the Nuremberg Charter reflect a desire to incorporate a stan-
dard of discrimination as the basis upon which they are to be
applied. In this respect, the law of war from which both com-
mon article 3 and article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter are
derived makes no reference to a policy of discrimination as a
requirement of finding criminal responsibility.
In fact, incorporation of the laws of war into the crimes
against humanity provision of the Nuremberg Charter ap-
peared to be proceeding away from, and not toward, requiring
discriminatory intent on the part of the perpetrator as a condi-
tion to criminal responsibility. Previously, the law of war had
required that the nationality of the victim be different from
that of the belligerent inflicting the harm or suffering. Article
6(c), on the other hand, eliminated the old requirement that
such a distinction in nationalities exist, thereby providing that
protection would be conferred universally upon civilians and
would not be dependent upon the discriminatory animus exist-
ing between warring peoples of differing nationalities. In this
sense, article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter "took a step for-
ward in the form of a jurisdictional extension when it provided
144. Junod, COMMENTARY TO PROTOCOL ]1, supra note 69, at 1340-41.
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that the victims of the same types of conduct that constitute
war crimes were protected without the requirement that they
be of a different nationality than that of the perpetrators."'45
The essential doctrine that protection is universal so far as
civilians are concerned and not dependent on a policy of dis-
crimination is made more explicit in common article 3. The
principles of humanity codified in common article 3 do not
require that there be a common plan of discrimination or per-
secution for a violation to exist; nor is it a requirement that
the victim of the offense be in the hands of a party to the con-
flict of which he is not a national, as is the case with the
"grave breaches" provisions. As explained in the Commentary
to Geneva Convention I:
The principle of respect for human personality, which is at
the root of all the Geneva Conventions, was not a product of
the Conventions. It is older than they are and independent of
them. Until 1949 it only found expression in the Conventions
in its application to military personnel. But it was not ap-
plied to them because of their military status: it is concerned
with persons, not as soldiers but as human beings, without
regard to their uniforms, their allegiance, their race, or their
religious or other beliefs, without regard even to any obliga-
tions the authority on which they depend may have assumed
in their name or in their behalf. Wounded or sick, they are
entitled as such to the care and aid which the respect for
human personality enjoins.'46
The recommended plain meaning interpretation of article
6(c) would have given rise to an interpretation which is more
in line with the general theory of the Yugoslavian Commission
of Experts that "crimes against humanity" under the
Nuremberg Charter and common article 3 to the Geneva Con-
ventions are codifications of customary law which predates the
adoption of either the Charter or the Conventions and which
can be characterized as "elementary dictates of humanity."
These fundamental principles, of which common article 3
145. BASSIOUNI, supra note 107, at 179.
146. COMMENTARY: I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CON-
DITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 39 (Jean
S. Pictet ed., 1952) (emphasis added) [hereinafter COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CON-
VENTION 1.
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stands as the most concise restatement, are significantly indif-
ferent to the source or motivation of the inhuman conduct
actually meted out. The foundation of humanitarian law is
preservation of and respect for the human personality. Accord-
ingly, the norms contained in common article 3 extend to all
persons who are hors de combat, irrespective of their race,
religion or nationality and regardless of their affiliation in the
conflict. 1 The protections against inhuman conduct, in other
words, are absolute and flow from the "care and aid which
respect for the human personality enjoins."'
E. Universal Criminal Jurisdiction Over Violations of a Jus
Cogens Norm
The construction of article 6(c) put forward by the Com-
mission of Experts for Yugoslavia and Rwanda substantially
omits contemporary scholarly opinion which maintains that the
deliberate violation of a fundamental international human
right may constitute a crime giving rise to universal jurisdic-
tion even in the absence of a treaty or convention. Further-
more, a reading of article 6(c) which conforms with the views of
these commentators, will show why the Yugoslavian
Commission's identification of "crimes against humanity" as a
codification of customary principles which are also restated in
common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions was substantially
correct.
The critical consideration supporting the broad interpreta-
tion of article 6(c) of the Nuremburg Charter in such a way as
to render it coextensive with common article 3 is the fact that
147. Id.
148. Id. Thus a fundamental policy under international humanitarian law is
that of universal protection, irrespective of distinctions based on nationality, race,
religion, ethnicity or political persuasion. A violation is not dependent upon the
perpetrator's executing a national policy of discrimination; rather, certain acts
(extrajudicial killings, torture, deportations and other inhuman acts) are punishable
per se if committed against a protected person. The universality principle has even
greater bearing with respect to the instant interpretation of "crimes against hu-
manity." As noted earlier, the construction offered requires that violations be pur-
suant to an official policy of discrimination, implying that the policy be state-spon-
sored. If that is the case, such a policy could not be entertained by insurgents
who would thereby be exempt from the tribunal's jurisdiction. Such an interpreta-
tion would contravene one of the most established policies of international humani-
tarian law, i.e., that the parties to the conflict be treated equally. See, e.g., Junod,
COMMENTARY TO PROTOCOL I, supra note 69, at 1345.
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such a reading will give full force to the jus cogens character of
"crimes against humanity." It is now a widely accepted doc-
trine with respect to international criminal jurisdiction that
the norms on which that jurisdiction is based can be either
conventional or customary. Violations of fundamental human
rights give rise to obligations erga omnes. Because of the fim-
damental nature of the norm which has been violated, states
have a compelling interest, as well as an obligation, inter se to
cooperate in the criminal process and bring violators of such
fundamental norms to justice."'
It is, however, not the explicitly proscribed character of the
crime which activates its erga omnes character, but rather the
importance of the right violated within the international legal
order.5 Rights which can properly be classified as jus
cogens, i.e., which have universally binding effect even in the
face of contrary state legislation, enjoy the highest status to
which any jurisprudential norm can aspire-non-derogability.
One writer has concluded that "[olne might argue that 'when
committed by individuals,' violations of erga omnes obligations
and peremptory norms 'may be punishable by any State under
the universality principle."""' In such instances, universal
jurisdiction may be grounded under customary international
law on the premise that the violator remains hostes humani
generis.
Thus, it is arguable that conventional human rights law
may have ceased to progress to the extent that it has success-
fully subjected to the universality principle offenses such as
mass exterminations not carried out pursuant to a policy of
discrimination or persecution. Such a claim cannot be made
with respect to customary international law. As noted previ-
ously, common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions stands as a
codification of customary norms which are external to and
independent of the development of conventional international
law. The scope of customary international law, as noted in the
149. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
3, 32 (Feb. 5) (new application).
150. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785, 836 (1988) (deeming it the "correct view" that "genocide
remains a crime giving rise to universal jurisdiction under customary international
law").
151. Id. at 830 (quoting OSCAR SCHAOHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 264 (1979)).
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Commentary to common article 3, clearly extends to inhuman
conduct exercised toward those who are not participants in the
combat and irrespective of nationality, race, religion or other
affiliation of the victim. The status of these norms as jus
cogens now cannot be doubted. As perhaps the leading contem-
porary commentator on international humanitarian law has
observed:
I believe that the norms stated in Article 3(1)(a)-(c) are of
such an elementary ethical character, and echo so many
provisions in other humanitarian and human rights treaties,
that they must be regarded as embodying minimum stan-
dards of customary law also applicable to non-international
armed conflicts. This is also true for the obligation to treat
humanely persons who are hors de combat, which is rooted in
Hague Regulations 23(c)-(d), which undoubtedly reflect cus-
tomary law, and in the customary obligation contained in the
law of human rights to treat with humanity all persons de-
prived of their liberty.152
As noted earlier, violation of ajus cogens norm can consti-
tute a crime giving rise to universal jurisdiction where individ-
ual criminal responsibility is asserted.15 In the instance of
widespread extrajudicial killings, deportations, torture, and
other inhuman acts carried out during internal conflict, the
case for universal jurisdiction is enhanced by the indispens-
ability of the rights protected by the peremptory norms of
common article 3 to the international legal order. In short, a
compelling argument can be advanced that these violations of
international humanitarian law must be made subject to the
universality principle in that the interests protected are those
which the "legal conscience of mankind deem[s] absolutely
essential to coexistence in the international community.""
152. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 69, at 34.
153. For an argument supporting the view that universal jurisdiction may gen-
erally be conflated with the jus cogens doctrine, see Randall, supra note 150, at
838. Randall opines that:
While the universality principle may be functionally distinguishable from
the jus cogens or erga omnes doctrines, the customary law condemnation
of these human rights offenses and the subjection of these offenses to the
erga omnes and jus cogens doctrines may logically support the expansion
of universal jurisdiction over these additional offenses r'murder and caus-
ing the disappearance of individuals" and "prolonged arbitrary detention'].
Id.
154. Parker & Neylon, supra note 14, at 415 (citing U.N. Conference on the
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The fundamental importance of the customary rules codi-
fied by common article 3 to the international legal order cannot
be sufficiently emphasized. Article 3 norms have been declared
by the International Court of Justice to be jus cogens and as
constituting "elementary considerations of humanity."155 The
extraordinary force of these principles, and their comparative
primacy within the international order can also be appreciated
from the description given of them in the Commentary to the
Geneva Convention. There, article 3 norms are described as
demanding respect for rules which were already recognized as
being essential to civilized existence long before the Conven-
tions were signed.56
The longstanding nature of these fundamental principles
taken together with their classification as quintessential "dic-
tates of humanity," establishes their priority status within the
hierarchy of customary norms. Treatise law makes clear that
the injunctions codified in common article 3 provide the corner-
stone of modern human rights and humanitarian law, setting
forth rules which are essential to the continuation of a civilized
international community. Accordingly, violators should be
subjected to universal jurisdiction as hostes humani generis.
As noted previously, an interpretation of article 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter should be arrived at which is consistent
with the unambiguous expression of jus cogens norms con-
tained in the provision thus bringing "crimes against humani-
ty" into conformity with common article 3. In this respect,
there is a valid presumption that an international legal instru-
ment purporting to restate jus cogens norms is, in fact, consis-
tent with those norms. The presumption here is enhanced by
the clear history of both common article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions and of article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter which
reveals that both instruments derive from customary law gov-
erning fundamental violations of the laws of war which do not
require a policy of discrimination for individual responsibility
Law of Treaties, 1st and 2d Sess., Vienna, Mar. 26-May 24, 1968, U.N. Doc.
AICONFJ39/1]]Add.2 (1971)).
155. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 105
(June 27).
156. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 146, at 50. To illus-
trate the universality of the principles under discussion, the Commentary indicates
that the rules would apply even outside the scope of internal armed conflict, i.e.,
to civil disturbances which could be described as acts of banditry. Id.
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to obtain.
Of more importance, common article 3 is a codification of
customary norms which, by virtue of theirjus cogens character,
give rise to universal jurisdiction over inhuman acts and it is
irrelevant that these have not been undertaken pursuant to an
"official policy" of discrimination. These norms have a legal
existence independent of conventions and treaties, even when
the latter seek to codify them. A reading of "crimes against
humanity," therefore, which would seek to condition universal
jurisdiction over inhuman acts by requiring that such acts be
committed under a state policy of discrimination might have
the effect of infringing upon the new hierarchy of international
human rights in which jus cogens is supreme law.157 Such an
interpretation would place article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Char-
ter in the practical position of a treaty provision (or of pre-
existing customary law) which had been superseded by a con-
flicting peremptory norm. In this respect:
This rule [i.e., that in domestic legislation a subsequent stat-
ute will defeat an inconsistent treaty] can have no bearing on
a jus cogens norm for the obvious reason that jus cogens
norms exist and are enforceable apart from treaties. Equally
obvious, any act or treaty which conflicts with a jus cogens
norm is void-such a conflicting document does not legally
exist.15s
157. See generally Meron, supra note 121.
158. Parker & Neylon, supra note 14, at 451. That violations of international
humanitarian law can give rise to universal jurisdiction based on the jus cogens
content of its provisions is accepted by commentators. Id. at 455 (footnotes omit-
ted):
The idea of universal jurisdiction and individual responsibility for viola-
tions of international law developed largely with the law of war. At the
end of World War II, an ad hoc international court, established by the
Nuremberg Charter, exercised jurisdiction over World War H criminals.
Reinforcing individual responsibility, the tribunal stated: "The very es-
sence of the Charter [establishing the tribunal] is that individuals have
international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience
imposed by the individual State." Since jus cogens obligations transcend
national boundaries, jurisdiction over violations of these international
standards must be universal.
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V. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the Rwandan and the Yugoslavi-
an war crimes tribunals with a view to exploring the "bases
and ranges" of international humanitarian penal jurisdiction.
The essential concern herein has arisen with respect to viola-
tions of fundamental human rights committed in internal
armed conflict for which no official policy of discrimination can
be established. The Appellate Chamber for the War Crimes
Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia has tentatively resolved this
lack of jurisdiction by finding that violations of common article
3 may give rise to individual criminal responsibility. However,
the court's ruling is qualified by the implicit condition to crimi-
nal liability that the misconduct be rendered criminal under
applicable municipal law.
At the same time, the tribunal has left undisturbed the
essential finding of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan Commis-
sions of Experts that "crimes against humanity" must be un-
dertaken pursuant to an official policy of discrimination in
order to constitute criminal violations. This limited reading of
article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter will have a dramatic
effect on the war crimes process affecting the former Yugosla-
via where the primary violators have been not a sovereign
entity, but rather the Bosnian Serbs themselves. As concerns
the latter, jurisdiction under the Nuremberg Charter's provi-
sion governing "crimes against humanity" seems highly vulner-
able. Because the Bosnian Serbs are not a state party, no offi-
cial policy of discrimination appears possible.
This paper strongly supports the result reached by the
Appellate Chamber to the effect that violations of basic human
rights in internal armed conflict may give rise to individual
criminal responsibility under common article 3, while being
mindful of the necessary limitations entailed in such a ruling.
An alternative has been recommended herein which largely
rests on the jus cogens character of both common article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions and article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter. An interpretation has been proposed, strongly sug-
gested by the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, that the
substantive violations set forth in the two instruments are
coextensive and are codifications of peremptory norms. This
reading is supported by accepted rules pertaining to the inter-
pretation of treaties, by the clear history of both instruments,
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and by the new hierarchy of international legal norms under
whichjus cogens constitutes supreme law.
Yet, whatever construction is given to article 6(c), and
irrespective of any inherent limitations surrounding the
criminalization of common article 3, there can be little doubt of
the jus cogens character of the norms contained in these in-
struments and their effect upon universal jurisdiction even in
the absence of conventional law. Article 53 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties provides that:
[a] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same charac-
ter.159
This paper has stressed the criminalization of these norms
in the Nuremberg Charter in light of the nullum crimen sine
lege doctrine which, as developed in the commentary to the
Geneva Conventions and Protocols, reflects some concern over
the application of a criminal sanction developing out of a pure-
ly customary norm which has received no express implementa-
tion in international or national jurisprudence. This limitation
has conditioned the growth of international precedent with
respect to common article 3 on criminalization under municipal
law. Moreover, it has been the need for a clear and unqualified
precedent under international law establishing universal juris-
diction over criminal atrocities committed during internal
armed conflict which has prompted an interpretation of article
6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter which seeks to make a living
legal reality of the Charter's clear commitment to the "usages
established among civilized peoples, [and to] the laws of hu-
manity, and the dictates of the public conscience." 60
159. Vienna Convention, supra note 108, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344.
160. Hague Convention, supra note 8, 8th pmbl. para. 8, 36 Stat. at 279-80.
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